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Abstract
We design an integrated distributed monitoring, TCP-friendly trafﬁc conditioning, and ﬂow control
system for securing network domains. Edge routers monitor (using tomography techniques) a network
domain to detect quality of service (QoS) violations– possibly caused by underprovisioning– as well as
bandwidth theft and denial of service (DoS) attacks. To bound the monitoring overhead, the router only
veriﬁes service level agreement (SLA) parameters such as delay, loss, and throughtput when anomalies
are detected. The marking component of the router uses TCP ﬂow characteristics to protect “fragile”
ﬂows. The edge routers may also regulate unresponsive ﬂows. Ingress routers propagate congestion
information to upstream domains. Preliminary simulation results indicate that this design increases
application-level throughput of data applications such as large FTP transfers; achieves low packet de-
lays and response times for Telnet and WWW trafﬁc; and detects trafﬁc-intensive attacks and service
violations.
1 Introduction
In the last few years, the areas of network monitoring and network tomography– mapping the Internet by
composing several end-to-end measurements– have witnessed a ﬂurry of research activity. These new re-
sults, however, have not been integrated with the more mature research on trafﬁc control. Our goal in this
paper is to demonstrate that trafﬁc conditioning at network domain edges, together with low-overhead mon-
itoring and unresponsive ﬂow control, mitigate congestion, unfairness, and misbehaving user problems in
Internet domains. Monitoring of network activity can aid in detecting denial of service and bandwidth theft
attacks, which have become an expensive problem in today’s Internet. We will integrate intelligent trafﬁc
marking with unresponsive ﬂow control and tomography-based network monitoring, with the objectives of
securing network domains from attacks and malicious users, and achieving higher user-perceivable quality
of service.
In the remainder of this section, we give some background on the differentiated services architecture–
which we use as an underlying quality of service (QoS) framework– and summarize our design. Section 2
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1discusses previous results related to the components of our proposed edge routers. Our network monitoring
and loss inference techniques for attack detection are discussed in section 3. Section 4 discusses the design
of adaptive TCP-aware trafﬁc conditioners. Section 5 explains how to detect and control unresponsive ﬂows
during congestion. Our simulation setup for performance evaluation is described in section 6. Section 7
discusses our main results. We conclude in section 8.
1.1 Differentiated Services
The differentiated services (diff-serv) architecture [4] is a simple approach to enhance quality of service
(QoS) for data and multimedia applications in the Internet. In diff-serv, complexity is pushed to the bound-
ary routers of a network domain to keep core routers simple. The edge routers at the boundary of an
administrative domain shape, mark, and drop trafﬁc if necessary. The operations are based on Service Level
Agreements (SLAs) between adjacent domains. The SLA deﬁnes what levels of service a user can expect
from a service provider. The agreement is to clarify the goal of both parties and ensure that both of them
abide the agreement. The trafﬁc enters a diff-serv domain at an ingress router and leaves a domain at an
egress router. An ingress router is responsible for ensuring that the trafﬁc entering the domain conforms to
the SLA with the upstream domain. An egress router may perform trafﬁc conditioning functions on trafﬁc
forwarded to a peering domain. In the core of the network, Per Hop Behaviors (PHBs) achieve service
differentiation. The current diff-serv speciﬁcation deﬁnes two PHB types: Expedited Forwarding [26] and
Assured Forwarding (AF) [24]. AF provides four classes (queues) of delivery with three levels of drop
precedence (DP0, DP1, and DP2) per class. The Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP), contained in
the IP header DSFIELD/ToS ﬁeld, is set to mark the drop precedence. When congestion occurs, packets
marked with higher precedence (e.g., DP2) must be dropped ﬁrst. The AF PHBs at core routers use an
active queue management algorithm such as Random Early Detection (RED) [20] for IN and OUT of proﬁle
(RIO) packets [10]. The RIO algorithm distinguishes between two types of packets, IN and OUT of proﬁle,
using two RED instances. To realize three drop precedences, three RED instances can be used.
1.2 Edge Routers
Edge routers perform critical trafﬁc conditioning and control functions. The edge router may alter the
temporal characteristics of a stream to bring it into compliance with a trafﬁc proﬁle speciﬁed by the network
administrator [4]. A trafﬁc meter measures and sorts packets into precedence levels. Marking, shaping, or
dropping decisions are based upon the measurement result.
Marking: Markers can mark packets deterministically or probabilistically. A probabilistic packet
marker, such as Time Sliding Window marker [14], obtains the current ﬂow rate, measuredRate, of a user
from the meter. The marker tags each packet based on the targetRate from the service level agreement and
the current ﬂow rate. An incoming packet is marked as IN proﬁle (low probability to drop) if the corre-
sponding ﬂow has not reached the target rate, otherwise the packet is marked as high drop precedence with
probability 1   p, where p is given by equation (1):
p =
measuredRate   targetRate
measuredRate
(1)
2Shaping/Dropping: Shaping reduces trafﬁc variation and provides an upper bound for the rate at
which the ﬂow trafﬁc is admitted into the network. A shaper usually has a ﬁnite-size buffer. Packets may
be discarded if there is not sufﬁcient space to hold the delayed packets. Droppers drop some or all of the
packets in a trafﬁc stream in order to bring the stream into compliance with the trafﬁc proﬁle. This process
is know as policing the stream.
1.3 Our Basic Design
Our proposed edge router (1) marks TCP trafﬁc with knowledge of TCP congestion control functions, (2)
controls unresponsiveﬂows and transferscongestion information upstream, and (3) monitors the network for
possible attacks and SLA violations. The three components aim at increasing application-level performance
and network resource utilization. Monitoring also aids in detecting and controlling denial of service (DoS)
attacks and under-provisioning problems. The edge router components, and the ﬂow of data and control
among them, are depicted in ﬁgure 1. We describe each component in the next few paragraphs.
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Figure 1: Monitoring, conditioning, and ﬂow control components inside an edge router to monitor and
control a network domain.
SLA Monitoring. QoS-enabled networks can face different attacks from traditional IP network do-
mains. For example, users may inject or re-mark trafﬁc with high QoS requirements which may cause other
users to have low throughput, high delay, and packet loss. We deﬁne an attack to an incident when users
violates the SLA or re-mark their packets to steal bandwidth from a network. Our SLA monitoring com-
ponent ﬂags service violations and bandwidth theft attacks. To monitor the network without core router
involvement, we use network tomography techniques such as per-segment loss inference mechanisms [12]
in an edge-to-edge manner.
Trafﬁc Conditioning. The routers utilize knowledge of TCP characteristics to give priority to “critical”
packets, and mitigate TCP bias to ﬂows with short round trip times (RTTs). While edge routers between a
stubdomainandatransitdomainarenotgenerallyoverloaded, manyedgerouters, suchasInternetExchange
points among peering domains, are highly loaded. Therefore, the edge routers use packet header information
instead of stored state when possible, and use replacement policies to control the amount of state maintained.
Congestion Control. Unresponsive ﬂows do not reduce their transmission rates in response to conges-
tion. Congestion collapse can be mitigated using improved packet scheduling or active queue management
3[5, 32], but such open loop techniques do not affect congestion caused by unresponsive ﬂows in upstream
domains. We need a mechanism to control the rate at which packets enter the domain to the rate at which
packets leave the domain. Congestion is detected when many high priority packets are dropped [38]. Ingress
routers which detect or infer such drop can regulate unresponsive ﬂows.
We conduct a series of simulation experiments to study the behavior of this framework. Preliminary
results show that TCP-aware edge router marking improves throughput of data extensive applications like
large FTP transfers, and achieves low packet delays and response times for Telnet and WWW trafﬁc. We
also demonstrate how attacks and unresponsive ﬂows alter network delay and loss characteristics, and hence
can be detected and controlled.
2 Related Work
Providing QoS in diff-serv networks has been extensively studied in the literature. Clark and Fang intro-
duced RIO in 1998 [10], and developed the Time Sliding Window (TSW) tagger. They show that sources
with different target rates can achieve their targets using RIO even for different Round Trip Times (RTTs),
whereas simple RED routers cannot. Assured Forwarding is studied by Ibanez and Nichols in [25]. They use
a token bucket marker and show that target rates and TCP/UDP interaction are key factors in determining
throughput of ﬂows. Seddigh, Nandy and Pieda [35] also show that the distribution of excess bandwidth
in an over-provisioned network is sensitive to UDP/TCP interactions. Lin, Zheng and Hou [27] propose an
enhanced TSW proﬁler, but their solution requires state information to be maintained at core routers. We
now discuss results related to the three components of our edge router.
2.1 Network Tomography and Violation Detection
Since bottleneck bandwidth inference techniques such as packet pairs were proposed in the early 1990s,
there has been increased interest in inference of internal network characteristics (e.g., per-segment delay,
loss, bandwidth, and jitter) using correlations among end-to-end measurements. This problem is called
network tomography. Recently, Dufﬁeld et al [12] have used unicast packet “stripes” (back-to-back probe
packets) to infer link-level loss by computing packet loss correlation for a stripe at different destinations.
This work is an extension of loss inference with multicast trafﬁc, e.g., [1, 7]. We develop a tomography-
based, low overhead method to infer delay, loss, and throughput and detect problems that alter the internal
characteristics of a network domain.
Network monitoring techniques have also been recently studied. In efﬁcient reactive monitoring [11],
global polling is combined with local event driven reporting to monitor IP networks. Breitbart et al [6] use
probing-based techniques where path latencies and bandwidth are measured by transmitting probes from a
single point of control. They ﬁnd the optimal number of probes using vertex cover solutions. Recent work
on SLA validation [8] uses a histogram aggregation algorithm to detect violations. The algorithm measures
network characteristics like loss ratio and delay on a hop-by-hop basis and uses them to compute end-to-end
measurements. These are then used in validating the end-to-end SLA requirements. We use an Exponential
Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) for delay, and average of several samples for loss as in RON [3], since
4it is more ﬂexible and accurate.
2.2 Trafﬁc Conditioning
Fang et al [14] proposed the Time Sliding Window Three Color Marker (TSW3CM), which we use as a
standard trafﬁc conditioner. Adaptive packet marking [16] uses a Packet Marking Engine (PME), which
can be a passive observer under normal conditions, but becomes an active marker at the time of congestion.
Yeom and Reddy [39] also convey marking information to the sender, so that it can slow down its sending
rate in the case of congestion. This requires modifying the host TCP implementation. Feroz et al [18]
propose a TCP-Friendly marker. The marker protects small-window ﬂows from packet loss by marking
their trafﬁc as IN proﬁle. We develop similar techniques with reduced overhead [21, 23]. Nandy et al design
RTT-aware trafﬁc conditioners [31] which adjust packet marking based on RTTs, to mitigate TCP RTT bias.
Their conditioner is based on the steady state TCP behavior as reported by Matthis et al in [29]. Their model,
however, does not consider time-outs which we consider in this paper.
2.3 Congestion Control
Floyd et al discuss congestion collapse from undelivered packets in [19]. Congestion collapse occurs when
upstream bandwidth is consumed by packets that are eventually dropped downstream. Seddigh et al [36]
propose separating TCP (responsive to congestion) and UDP (may be unresponsive) to control congestion
collapse caused by UDP. Albuquerque et al [2] propose a mechanism, Network Border Patrol, where border
routers monitor all ﬂows, measure ingress and egress rates, and exchange per-ﬂow information with all edge
routers periodically. The scheme is elegant, but its overhead is high. Chow et al [9] propose a similar
framework, where edge routers periodically obtain information from core routers, and adjust conditioner
parameters accordingly. We propose to only send load information during congestion, since core networks
may be lightly loaded most of the time. In the Direct Congestion Control Scheme (DCCS) [38], only drops
of packets with the lowest drop priority are tracked. We follow the same methodology to detect congestion
and control unresponsive ﬂows. Aggregate-based Congestion Control (ACC) detects and controls high
bandwidth aggregate ﬂows [28]. We use similar IP preﬁx matching of destination addresses to detect attacks
targeting the same destination.
3 Tomography-based Violation Detection Component
QoS network domains should detect service violations (excessive delay or loss that customers experience)
and bandwidth theft attacks. An attacker can impersonate a legitimate customer by spooﬁng its identity.
Network ﬁltering [17] can detect spooﬁng if the attacker and the impersonated customer are in different
domains, but the attacks may proceed unnoticed otherwise. QoS domains support low priority classes, such
as best effort, which are not controlled by edge routers. The service provider should ensure that high priority
customers are getting their agreed-upon service, so that the network can be re-conﬁgured or re-provisioned if
needed, and attackers which bypass or fool edge controls are prevented. In case of distributed DoS attacks,
ﬂows from various ingress points are aggregated as they approach their victim. Monitoring can control
5such high bandwidth aggregates at the edges, and propagate attack information to upstream domains [22].
As with any detection mechanism, the attackers can attack the mechanism itself, but the cost to attack our
distributed monitoring mechanism is higher than the cost to inject or spoof trafﬁc, or bypass a single edge
router.
The network tomography is an approach to infer the internal behavior of a network based on purely
end-to-end measurements. We use edge-to-edge measurement-based loss inference technique to to detect
service violations and attacks in a QoS domain. To achieve scalability, the measurements do not involve any
core router. We measure SLA parameters such as delay, packet loss, and throughput to ensure that users are
obtaining their agreed upon service. Delay is deﬁned as the edge-to-edge latency; packet loss is the ratio of
total ﬂow packets dropped in the domain 1 to the total packets of the same ﬂow which entered the domain;
and throughput is the total bandwidth consumed by a ﬂow inside a domain. If a network domain is properly
provisioned and no user is misbehaving, the ﬂows traversing the domain should not experience excessive
delay or loss. Although jitter (delay variation) is another important SLA parameter, it is ﬂow-speciﬁc and
therefore, not suitable to use in network monitoring. In this section, we describe edge-to-edge measurement
and inference of delay, loss and throughput, and a violation detection mechanism.
3.1 Delay Measurements
Delay bound guarantees made by a provider network to customer ﬂows are for the delays experienced by
the ﬂows while traversing between the ingress and egress edges of the provider domain. For each packet
traversing an ingress router, the ingress copies the packet IP header into a new packet with a certain pre-
conﬁgured probability p probe. The ingress encodes the current time into the payload and marks the protocol
identiﬁer ﬁeld of the IP header with a new value. The egress router recognizes such packets and removes
them from the network. Additionally, the egress router computes the packet delay for ﬂow i by subtracting
the ingress time form the egress time. (We assume NTP is used to synchronize the clocks.) The egress
then sends the packet details and the measured delay to an entity we call the SLA monitor. At the monitor,
the packets are classiﬁed as belonging to customer j and the average packet delay of the customer trafﬁc is
updated using an exponential weighted moving average (EWMA) (we use a current sample weight 0.2). If
this average packet delay exceeds the delay guarantee in the SLA, we conclude that this may be an indication
of a SLA violation.
3.2 Loss Inference
Packet loss guarantees made by a provider network to a customer are for the packet losses experienced by its
conforming trafﬁc inside the provider domain. Measuring loss by observing packet drop at all core routers
and communicating them to the SLA monitor at the edge imposes signiﬁcant overhead. We use packet
stripes [12] to infer link-level loss characteristics inside the domain. A series of probe packets with no delay
between the transmission of successive packets, or what is known as a “stripe,” is periodically transmitted.
For a two-leaf tree spanned by nodes 0, k, R1, R2, stripes are sent from the root 0 to the leaves to estimate the
1a ﬂow can be a micro ﬂow deﬁned by source and destination addresses and ports, and protocol identiﬁer or an aggregate of
several micro ﬂows.
6characteristics of three links (ﬁgure 2). For example, the ﬁrst two packets of a 3-packet stripe are sent to R 2
and the last one to R1. If a packet reaches a receiver, we can deduce that the packet has reached the branch
point k. By monitoring the packet arrivals at R1, R2 and both, we can write equations with three known
quantities and estimate the three unknown quantities (loss rates of links 0 ! k, k ! R1 and k ! R1) by
applying conditional probability deﬁnitions, as discussed in [12]. We combine estimates of several stripes
to limit the effect of non-perfect correlation among the packets in a stripe. This inference technique extends
to trees with more than 2 leaves and more than 2 levels [12].
0
k
R R2 1
Figure 2: Binary tree to infer per-segment loss from source 0 to receivers R1 and R2
We extend this end-to-end unicast probing scheme to routers with multiple active queue management in-
stances, e.g., 3-color RED [20], and develop heuristics for the probing frequency and the particular receivers
to probe to ensure good domain coverage. Assured forwarding queues use three drop precedences referred
to as green, yellow, and red. Suppose Pred is the percentage of red packets accepted (not dropped) by the
active queue. We deﬁne percentages for yellow and green trafﬁc similarly, and show how these percentages
are computed in the appendix. Link loss can be inferred by subtracting the transmission probability from 1.
If Lg, Ly, and Lr are the inferred losses of green, yellow and red trafﬁc respectively, loss can be expressed
as:
Lclass =
ngPgreenLg + nyPyellowLy + nrPredLr
ng + ny + nr
(2)
where ni is number of samples taken from i-colored packets. However, when loss of green trafﬁc is zero,
we take the average of yellow and red losses. When the loss of yellow trafﬁc is also zero, we report only
loss of red probes. We reduce the overhead of loss inference by probing the domain links with high delay
only, as determined by the delay measurement procedure. We also measure throughput by probing egress
routers only when delay and loss are excessive. This helps pinpoint the user or aggregate which is consuming
excessive bandwidth, and causing other ﬂows to receive lower quality than their SLAs.
3.3 Violation and Attack Detection
When delay, loss, and bandwidth consumption exceed the pre-deﬁned thresholds, the monitor concludes
there may be an SLA violation or attack. Excessive delay is an indication of abnormal conditions inside the
network domain. If there are losses for the premium trafﬁc class, or if the loss ratios of assured forwarding
trafﬁc classes exceed certain levels, a possible SLA violation is ﬂagged. The violation can be caused by
aggressive or unresponsive ﬂows, denial of service attacks, ﬂash crowds, or network under-provisioning. To
detect distributed DoS attacks, the set of links with high loss are identiﬁed. If high bandwidth aggregates
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crowd, as discussed in [28]. If this is determined to be an attack, the appropriate ingress routers are notiﬁed
and the offending user trafﬁc is throttled, as discussed in section 5.
4 Trafﬁc Marking Component
We incorporate several techniques in the conditioner to improve performance of applications running on top
of TCP. The ﬁrst few packets of a TCP ﬂow should not be dropped to allow the TCP congestion window to
grow. At the edge router, we give low drop priority to SYN packets as indicated in the TCP header. Since
TCP grows the congestion window exponentially until it reaches the slow start threshold, ssthresh, and the
congestion window is reduced to 1 or half of the ssthresh for time-outs or packet loss, we may also protect
small window ﬂows from packet losses by marking them with DP0, as proposed in [18]. Edge routers use
sequencenumberinformationinpacketheadersinbothdirectionstodeterminethis. ECN-Capable TCPmay
reduce its congestion window due to a time-out, triple duplicate ACKs, or in response to explicit congestion
notiﬁcation (ECN) [34]. In this case, TCP sets the CWR ﬂag in the TCP header of the ﬁrst data packet sent
after the window reduction. Therefore, we give low drop priority for a packet if the CWR or ECN bit is
set. This avoids consecutive ssthresh reductions that lead to poor performance with TCP Reno [13]. We
also mark packets inversely proportionally to the square of the ﬂow requested rates if proportional sharing
of excess bandwidth is required [31]. The marker avoids marking high drop priority in bursts to work well
with TCP Reno, as proposed in [18].
We also use an RTT-aware trafﬁc conditioner to avoid the TCP short RTT bias, if RTT and RTO infor-
mation is available. Equation (3) shows that, in a simple TCP model that considers only duplicate ACKs
[29], bandwidth is inversely proportional to RTT where MSS is the maximum segment size and p is the
packet loss probability:
BW /
MSS
RTT
p
p
(3)
An RTT-aware marking algorithm based on this model (proposed in [31]) works well for a small number of
ﬂows because equation (3) accurately represents the fast retransmit and recovery behavior when p is small.
We have observed that for a large number of ﬂows, short RTT ﬂows time out because only long RTT ﬂows
are protected by the conditioner after satisfying the target rates. To mitigate this unfairness, we use the
throughput approximation by Padhye et al [33]:
BW /
MSS
RTT
q
2bp
3 + To  min(1;3
q
3bp
8 )p(1 + 32p2)
(4)
wherebisthenumberofpacketsacknowledgedbyareceivedACK,andToisthetime-outlength. Designing
an RTT-aware trafﬁc conditioner using equation (4) is more accurate than using equation (3) because it
considers time-outs. Simplifying this equation, we compute the packet drop ratio between two ﬂows,  as:
2 =
RTT1
RTT2
2

To1
To2
(5)
8for For each incoming ﬂow do
if there is a complete state entry for this ﬂow then
statePresent = TRUE
Update the state table
else
statePresent = FALSE
Add the ﬂow in the state table (replace if needed)
end if
if statePresent is TRUE then
Use Standard TC with SYN, ECN, CWR, small window, burst, RTT-RTO
else
Use Standard TC with SYN, ECN, and CWR
end if
end for
Figure 3: Algorithm for Adaptive Trafﬁc Conditioner
where RTTi and Toi are the RTT and time-out of ﬂow i respectively [21]. The marker uses both equation
(5) and equation (1).
Each of the techniques discussed in this section has advantages and limitations. Protecting SYN, ECN,
and CWR packets, and marking according to the target rate do not need to store per ﬂow information and are
simple to implement. On the other hand, protecting small window ﬂows and marking according to the RTT
and RTO values requires maintaining and processing per ﬂow information. To bound state overhead at the
edge routers, we store per ﬂow information at the edge only for a certain number of ﬂows based on available
memory. The edge router uses a least recently used (LRU) state replacement policy when the number of
ﬂows exceeds the maximum number that can be maintained. Therefore, for every ﬂow, conditioning is based
on state information if it is present. If there is no state present, conditioning only uses techniques that rely
on header information. The conditioner pseudo-code is given in ﬁgure 3.
5 Unresponsive Flow Control Component
This section describes the detection and control of unresponsive ﬂows. SLA monitors (or core routers)
inform edge routers of congestion inside a domain. A shaping algorithm controls unresponsive ﬂows at
the time of congestion. In addition, ingress routers of a domain may propagate congestion information
to the egress router of the upstream domain. A stub domain that is connected to only end users does not
propagate this information to the users, instead, controls the incoming ﬂows to conform with the service
level agreements.
95.1 Optional Core Router Detection
In section 3, we have shown how tomography-based loss inference techniques can be applied to detect per-
segment losses using edge-to-edge probes. An alternative strategy is to track excessive drop of high priority
(i.e., green or DP0) packets at core routers, as proposed in [38]. We adapt this technique to detect congestion
only for unresponsive ﬂows using protocol information from the transport layer. The responsive ﬂows such
as TCP or TCP-friendly will not be punished because they react to a congestion. The core router tracks
the tuple fsource address, destination address, source port, destination port, protocol identiﬁer, timestamp,
btlnkbwg for dropped DP0 packets. The outgoing link bandwidth at the core, btlnkbw, helps regulate the
ﬂow: edge routers shape more aggressively if the core has a thin outgoing link. The core sends this drop
information to the ingress routers only when the total drop exceeds a local threshold (thus the ﬂow seems
non-adaptive). The information is sent only during congestion and only for the ﬂows that are violating
SLAs. Thus, this design does not affect the scalability of the network.
5.2 Metering and Shaping
At the egress routers, we distinguish two types of drops: drop due to metering and shaping at downstream
routers sdrop, and drop due to congestion at core/edge routers, cdrop. Egress/core routers communicate
this drop information to ingress routers and the upstream egress router. For a particular ﬂow, assume the
bottleneck bandwidth is btlnkbw (as given above); the bandwidth of the outgoing link of the ﬂow at the
ingress router is linkbw; the ﬂow has an original proﬁle (target rate) of targetrate; and the current weighted
average rate for this ﬂow is wavg. In case of cdrop, the proﬁle of the ﬂow is updated temporarily (to yield
rate newprofile) using equations (6) and (7) where 0 <  < 1 is the congestion control aggressiveness
parameter:
decrement = cdrop  packet size  max(1;
linkbw
btlnkbw
) (6)
newprofile = max(0;min(newprofile   decrement;
wavg   decrement)) (7)
A higher value of  speeds up convergence, but application QoS may deteriorate. A lower value makes
trafﬁc smoother, but it takes longer to readjust the rate. The “max” term in the equation can be ignored if
the bottleneck bandwidth information cannot be obtained (tools like pathchar or Nettimer cannot be used),
or core router detection (section 5.1) is unavailable. In equation (7), the weighted average of the arrival rate
is computed using the Time Sliding Window [10] algorithm.
For sdrop, the proﬁle is adjusted as follows:
newprofile = max(0;newprofile   sdrop  packet size) (8)
The newprofile is initialized to targetrate. In the absence of drops, the router increases the adjusted
proﬁle periodically at a certain rate increment. The rate increment is initialized to a constant number
of packets each time the router receives drop information, and is doubled when there is no drop, until it
reaches a threshold
wavg
f , and then it is increased linearly. Thus, the rate adjustment algorithm follows TCP
10congestion control. At the edge, shaping is based on the current average rate and the adjusted proﬁle. For
each incoming ﬂow, if the current average rate is greater than the adjusted proﬁle, some misbehaving ﬂow
packets are dropped.
6 Simulation Setup
We use simulations to study the effectiveness of our edge router design. The ns-2 simulator [30] with
the differentiated services implementation of Nortel Networks [37] is used. We use the following RED
parameters fminth, maxth, Pmaxg: for DP0 f40, 55, 0.02g; for DP1 f25, 40, 0.05g; and for DP2 f10,
25, 0.1g (as suggested by [31]). wq is 0.002 for all REDs. TCP New Reno is used with a packet size of
1024 bytes and a maximum window of 64 packets. We vary the number of micro-ﬂows (where a micro-
ﬂow represents a single TCP/UDP connection) per aggregate from 10 to 200. We compute the following
performance metrics:
Throughput. This denotes the average bytes received by the receiver application over simulation time. A
higher throughput usually means better service for the application (e.g., shorter completion time for
an FTP ﬂow). For the ISP, higher throughput implies that links are well-utilized.
Packet Drop Ratio. This is the ratio of total packets dropped to the total packets sent. A user can specify
for certain applications that packet drop should not exceed a certain threshold.
Packet Delay. For delay sensitive application like Telnet, the packet delay is a user metric.
Response Time. This is the time between sending a request to a Web server and receiving the response
back from the server.
7 Simulation Results
The objective of this preliminary set of experiments is to evaluate the effectiveness of the three components
of our edge router. In the next few sections, we study the performance of each component under various
conditions.
7.1 Detecting Attacks and SLA Violations
In this section, we investigate the accuracy and effectiveness of the delay, loss, and throughput approxima-
tion methods for detecting violations discussed in section 3. We use a similar network topology to that used
in [12] as depicted in ﬁgure 4. The violation detection scheme works for higher link capacity and for a
larger network network topology as it is shown in ﬁgure 4. Having links with capacity higher than 10 Mbps
requires more trafﬁc to simulate an attack. Multiple domains are connected to all edges routers through
which ﬂows enter into the network domain. The ﬂows are created from domains attached to E1, E2, E3
and destined to the domains connected to edge router E6 so that the link C4 ! E6 is congested. An attack
is simulated on C4 ! E6 to show that the edge routers can detect service violations and attacks due to
11ﬂow aggregation towards a downstream domain. Many other ﬂows are created to ensure all links carry a
signiﬁcant number of ﬂows.
We ﬁrst measure delay when the network is correctly provisioned or over-provisioned (and thus experi-
ences little delay and loss). The delay of E1 ! E6 is 100 ms; E1 ! E7 delay is 100 ms; and E5 ! E4
delay is 160 ms. Attacks are simulated on router E6 through links C3 ! C4 and C4 ! E6. With the
attack trafﬁc, the average delay of the E1 ! E6 link increases from 100 ms to approximately 180 ms. Since
all the core router to core router links have a higher capacity than other links, C4 ! E6 becomes the most
congested link.
Figure 5 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of edge-to-edge delay for the link E1 ! E6
under various trafﬁc loads and in presence of attacks. When there is no attack, the end-to-end delay is close
to the link transmission delay. If the network path E1 ! E6 is lightly loaded, for example with a 30%
load, the delay does not go signiﬁcantly higher than the link transmission delay. Even when the path is
60% loaded (medium load in Figure 5), the edge-to-edge delay of link E1 ! E6 is increased by less than
30%. Some instantaneous values of delay go as high as 50% of the link transmission delay but the average
value does not ﬂuctuate a lot. In both cases, the network is properly provisioned, i.e., the ﬂows do not
violate the SLAs. On the other hand, an excess trafﬁc introduced by an attacker increases the edge-to-edge
delay and most of the packets of attack trafﬁc experience a delay 40-70% higher (Figure 5) than the link
transmission delay. Delay measurement is thus a good indication of the presence of excess trafﬁc inside a
network domain.
Thefrequencyofdelayprobingisacriticalparameterthataffectstheaccuracyoftheestimation. Sending
fewer probes reduces overhead but using only a few probes can produce inaccurate estimation, especially
when some of the probes are lost in the presence of excess trafﬁc due to an attack.
C2
C1
C4
E1
E5
C3
E3
E4
E6
E7
C5
E2
Core Router
Edge Router
20 Mbps, 30 ms 
10 Mbps, 20 ms
Figure 4: Topology used to infer loss and detect service violations. All edge routers are connected to
multiple domains, and each domain has multiple hosts.
We demonstrate detection of such abnormal conditions using delay measurements in three scenarios
labeled “No attack”, “Attack 1”, and “Attack 2” in ﬁgure 6. “No attack” indicates no signiﬁcant trafﬁc in
excess of capacity. This is the normal case of proper network provisioning and trafﬁc conditioning at the
edge routers. Attacks 1 and 2 inject more trafﬁc into the network domain from different ingress points.
The intensity of the attack is increased during time t=15 seconds to t=45 seconds. Loss is inferred when
high delay is experienced inside the network domain. To infer loss inside a QoS network, green, yellow,
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Figure 5: Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of one way delay from E1 to E6
and red probes are used. We use equation (2) to compute overall trafﬁc loss per class in a QoS network.
The loss measurement results are depicted in ﬁgure 7. The loss ﬂuctuates with time, but the attack causes
packet drops of 15% to 25% in the case of Attack 1 and more than 35% with Attack 2. We ﬁnd that it takes
approximately 10 seconds for the inferred loss to converge to the same value as the real loss in the network.
Approximately 20 stripes per second are required to infer a loss ratio close to the actual value. For more
details on the probing frequencies and convergence of the estimations, see [22].
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Figure 6: Observed delay on the path E1 ! E6 at the time of an attack. “Attack 1” results in packet loss in
excess of 15-30%. “Attack 2” increases packet loss to more than 35%.
Delay and loss estimation, together with the appropriate thresholds, can thus indicate the presence of
abnormal conditions, such as distributed DoS attacks and ﬂash crowds. When the SLA monitor detects such
an anomaly, it polls the edge devices for throughputs of ﬂows. Using these outgoing rates at egress routers,
the monitor computes the total bandwidth consumption by any particular user. This bandwidth is compared
to the SLA bandwidth. By identifying the congested links and the egress routers connected to the congested
links, the downstream domain where an attack or crowd is headed is identiﬁed. Using IP preﬁx matching, we
determine whether many of these ﬂows are aggregated towards a speciﬁc network or host. If the destination
conﬁrms this is an attack, we control these ﬂows at the ingress routers.
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Figure 7: Packet loss ratio in link C4 ! E6 follows the same pattern as the edge-to-edge delay of the path
E1 ! E6.
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Figure 8: Simulation topologies. All links are 10 Mbps. Capacity of the bottleneck links are altered in some
experiments.
7.2 Adaptive Conditioning
As discussed in section 4, TCP-aware marking can improve application QoS. We ﬁrst perform several exper-
iments to study each marking technique separately and study all combinations. We ﬁnd that protecting SYN
packets is useful for short-lived connections and very high degrees of multiplexing. Protecting connections
with small window sizes (SW) contributes the most to total bandwidth gain, followed by protecting CWR
packets and SYN. SW favors short RTT connections, but it reduces packet drop ratio and time-outs for long
RTT connections as well, compared to a standard trafﬁc conditioner. Not marking in bursts is effective for
short RTT connections. If SW is not used, Burst+CWR achieves higher bandwidth than any other combi-
nation. The RTT-RTO based conditioner mitigates the RTT-bias among short and long RTT ﬂows. This is
because when the congestion window is small, there is a higher probability of time-outs in the case of packet
drops. Protecting packets (via DP0 marking) when the window is small reduces time-outs, especially back-
to-back time-outs. A micro ﬂow also recovers from time-outs when RTO as well as RTT is used to mark
packets. All these marking principles are integrated together with an adaptive state replacement policy, as
given in ﬁgure 3. We now evaluate the performance of this adaptive trafﬁc conditioner with FTP and CBR
trafﬁc, Telnet and WWW applications. The network hosts and routers are ECN-enabled for all experiments
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Figure 9: Achieved bandwidth with the standard conditioner and adaptive conditioner. “Max” is the band-
width when the standard conditioner is combined with all marking techniques and stores per-ﬂow informa-
tion for all ﬂows.
in this section, since we use the ECN and CWR packet protection mechanism. Additional results can be
found in [23].
Figure 9(a) compares the bandwidth with the standard and with the adaptive (ﬁgure 3) conditioner for
the simple topology shown in ﬁgure 8 (a). The total throughput is measured over the simulation time at
the receiving end. “Max” is the bandwidth when the standard conditioner is combined with all marking
techniques and stores per-ﬂow information for all ﬂows. The adaptive conditioner outperforms the standard
one for all aggregate ﬂows. The adaptive conditioner is more fair in the sense that short RTT ﬂows do not
steal bandwidth from long RTT ﬂows and total achieved bandwidth is close to 10 Mbps (bottleneck link
speed).
Figure 8(b) depicts a more complex simulation topology where three domains are interconnected (all
links are 10 Mbps). The link delay between host and the edge is varied from 1 to 10 ms for different hosts
connected to a domain to simulate users at variable distances from same edge routers. Aggregate ﬂows are
created between nodes n1 ! n8, n2 ! n9, n3 ! n4, n5 ! n6, and n7 ! n9. Thus, ﬂows are of different
RTTs and experience bottlenecks at different links. Not all ﬂows start/stop transmission at the same time–
ﬂows last from less than a second to a few seconds. C2 ! E4, E5 ! C4 and C4 ! E7 are the most
congested links. Figure 9(b) shows the total bandwidth gain for this topology with different conditioners.
From the ﬁgure, the adaptive conditioner performs better than the standard one, and achieves performance
close to the maximum capacity. In addition, the adaptive conditioner improves fairness between short and
long RTT ﬂows, without requiring large state tables.
When each aggregate ﬂow contains 200 micro ﬂows, the soft state table for the adaptive conditioner
covers only a small percentage (4.16%) of the ﬂows passing through it. We use a table for the 50 most recent
micro-ﬂows. Table 1 shows that the bandwidth achieved with the adaptive conditioner always outperforms
standard conditioner. Note that when critical TCP packets are protected, they are charged from the user
proﬁle to ensure that UDP trafﬁc is not adversely affected.
We also study performance with Telnet (delay-sensitive) and WWW (response time sensitive) applica-
tions. For the Telnet experiments, the performance metric used is the average packet delay time for each
15Micro Standard Adaptive Max Adaptive (% ﬂows
ﬂows Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth covered at E4)
10 12.65 12.87 12.87 41.16
50 12.18 13.84 14.20 16.66
100 11.67 13.48 14.89 8.33
200 11.77 13.61 14.91 4.16
Table 1: Bandwidth shown is in Mbps. State table size = 50 micro-ﬂows.
Conditioner Avg response time Std Avg response time Std
(sec), ﬁrst pkt dev (sec), all pkts dev
Standard 0.48 0.17 2.23 0.78
Adaptive 0.45 0.14 2.15 0.75
Table 2: Response time for WWW trafﬁc. Number of concurrent sessions = 50
Telnet packet. We use the topology in Figure 8(b), but capacity of the C1 ! E4 and E5 ! E7 links is
changed to 0.5 Mbps and all other link capacities are 1 Mbps to introduce congestion. We simulate 100
Telnet sessions among hosts n1 ! n8, n2 ! n9, n3 ! n4, n5 ! n6, and n7 ! n9. A session transfers
between 10 and 35 TCP packets. Results show that the adaptive conditioner reduces packet delay over the
standard conditioner for short RTT ﬂows.
Since web trafﬁc constitutes most (60%-80%) of the Internet trafﬁc, we study our trafﬁc conditioner
with the WWW trafﬁc model in ns-2 [30]. Details of the model are given in [15]. The model uses HTTP
1.0 with TCP Reno. The servers are attached to n6, n8 and n9 in ﬁgure 8 (b), and n1, n2 and n5 are used as
clients. A client can send a request to any server. Each client generates a request for 5 pages with a variable
number of objects (e.g., images) per page. The default ns-2 probability distribution parameters are used to
generate inter-session time, inter-page time, objects per page, inter-object time, and object size (in kB). The
network setup is same as with Telnet trafﬁc. Table 2 shows the average response time per WWW request
received by the client. Two response times are shown in the table; one is to get the ﬁrst packet and another is
to get all data. The table shows that our adaptive conditioner reduces response time over the standard trafﬁc
conditioner. The adaptive conditioner does not change the response time signiﬁcantly if the network is not
congested.
7.3 Congestion Control
We conduct experiments to demonstrate the role of the congestion control mechanism in preventing con-
gestion collapse. Figure 8(a) depicts the simple topology used to demonstrate congestion collapse due to
unresponsive ﬂows. An aggregate TCP ﬂow with 10 micro-ﬂows from host n1 to n3 and a UDP aggre-
gate ﬂow with 10 micro-ﬂows from host n2 ! n4 are created. Both ﬂows have the same target rate (5
Mbps). Figure 10 shows how TCP and UDP ﬂows behave with respect to changing the bottleneck band-
width (btlnkbw) from 1   5 Mbps. The X-axis denotes the btlnkbw and Y -axis gives the throughput
achieved by both ﬂows. Figure 10(a) shows that the TCP ﬂow gets its share of 5 Mbps all the time because
it does not go through the congested link. When the bottleneck bandwidth is 1 Mbps, 4 Mbps are wasted by
UDP ﬂows in the absence of the ﬂow control. Figure 10(b) shows that, with ﬂow control, the TCP ﬂow gets
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Figure 10: a. Without ﬂow control and the TCP gets only 5 Mbps when bottleneck bandwidth is 1 Mbps of
topology in Figure 8(a). b. With Flow control and now TCP gets 8 Mbps. Both ﬂows have the same proﬁle.
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Figure 11: Dynamic adjustment of F2 ﬂow works ﬁne in the presence of cross trafﬁc. TCP ﬂow (F1) gets
more bandwidth with the ﬂow control scheme.
an extra 8 Mbps when btlnkbw is 1 Mbps. The ﬂow control mechanism prevents congestion collapse due to
undelivered packets.
We also experiment with varying the rate ratio, Rr =
SendingRate
Profile for UDP trafﬁc. A R r of 0.5 means
that the ﬂow is sending at 50% of its proﬁle and a Rr of 4 means the ﬂow is sending at four times its proﬁle.
When the UDP sending rate is zero, TCP can use the entire 10 Mbps, and there is no shaping (shaping drop
is zero) at the edge. When the UDP sending rate causes drops at the bottleneck link (e.g., when btlnkbw= 1
Mbps), congestion collapse occurs in the absence of ﬂow control. With ﬂow control, even when R r is 4 (the
proﬁle is 5 Mbps and UDP is sending at 20 Mbps), there is no congestion collapse.
A more complex topology with multiple domains (ﬁgure 8(b)) and with cross trafﬁc is also used to study
the ﬂow control framework. An aggregate of TCP ﬂows F1 between n1 ! n8 is created, in addition to
several UDP ﬂows such as F2, Cr1, Cr2, and Cr3 between n2 ! n9, n3 ! n4, n5 ! n6, and n7 ! n10
respectively. These Crs are used as cross trafﬁc. The start and the ﬁnish times of the Crs ﬂows are set
differently to change the overall trafﬁc load over the path for the ﬂows F1 and F2. There are 10 micro ﬂows
per aggregate in this setup. Flows F1 and F2 have same proﬁle with target rate 5 Mbps, and cross trafﬁc
sending rate is 2 Mbps.
17Figure 11 illustrates the bandwidth of these aggregate ﬂows with and without ﬂow control. The cross
trafﬁc achieves the same target in both schemes, because the ﬂows do not send more than their proﬁles and
they do not encounter any bottleneck. If there is no ﬂow control, F1 (TCP) cannot achieve its target 5 Mbps.
With ﬂow control, F1 obtains more than the target. This is because, after controlling UDP, TCP uses the
remaining bandwidth.
8 Conclusions
We have investigated tomography-based edge-to-edge probing methods to detect service level agreement
violations in QoS networks, together with TCP-aware conditioning and ﬂow control for unresponsive ﬂows.
SLA violation detection is useful for network re-dimensioning, as well as for detecting distributed denial
of service attacks. We design methods that use edge-to-edge packet stripes to infer loss for different drop
precedences in a QoS network, based on observed delays. Aggregate throughputs are then measured to
detect distributed denial of service attacks or ﬂash crowds.
Marking, shaping, and policing are also adapted to respond to detection results and adapt to ﬂow char-
acteristics. We give priority to critical TCP packets and mark according to ﬂow characteristics. We use
an adaptive conditioner that overwrites previous state information based on a least recently used strategy.
Marking is based on information in packet headers if state information for a ﬂow is unavailable. The adap-
tive conditioner is shown to improve FTP throughput, reduce packet delay for Telnet, and response time
for WWW trafﬁc. The conditioner also mitigates TCP RTT bias if it can deduce the ﬂow RTT and RTO.
Finally, we have designed a simple method to regulate unresponsive ﬂows to prevent congestion collapse
due to undelivered packets.
Most of our ideas can be applied to any architecture that supports service differentiation, or directly
with active queue management techniques at network routers. For example, the RED algorithm at network
routers can itself protect critical TCP packets, e.g., CWR marked packets, from drop without requiring
any additional state. The adaptive conditioner concept can also be employed to keep some window size
information and use that in RED dropping decisions. We are currently implementing the edge router, and
setting up a simple testbed to validate the simulation results of our framework.
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Appendix
Percentages used in multi-priority loss inference:
1
drop P
red P
Rmin Rmax Ymin
yellow P
Ymax Gmin Gmax
Avg queue length
Pgreen
Figure 12: RED Parameters for Three Drop Precedences
Figure 12 depicts the drop probabilities in RED with three drop precedences. The red trafﬁc has higher
drop priority than yellow and green trafﬁc. The red trafﬁc is dropped with a probability P red when the
average queue size lies between two thresholds Rmin and Rmax. All incoming red packets are dropped when
the average queue length exceeds Rmax. Pyellow and Pgreen are similar. Suppose G(n) is the probability
that an incoming green packet will be accepted by the queue given that n packets are in the queue. Y (n)
and R(n) are deﬁned similarly for yellow and red trafﬁc respectively. The  values for green packets are
deﬁnes as follows:
G(n) = 1; if n < Gmin
G(n) = 0; if n > Gmax
G(n) = 1   Pgreen
n   Gmin
Gmax   Gmin
;otherwise (9)
The equations are similar for yellow and red trafﬁc. Let P0
red be the percentage of packet drops due to
active queue management for red packets, and let P0
yellow and P0
green be deﬁned similarly for yellow and
green respectively. These percentages can be computed as:
P0
red =
Rmax   Rmin
Rmax
 Pred +
Gmax   Rmax
B
 100 (10)
21P0
yellow =
Ymax   Ymin
Ymax
 Pyellow +
Gmax   Ymax
B
 100 (11)
P0
green =
Gmax   Gmin
Gmax
 Pgreen (12)
where B is the buffer (queue) size at the router. The percentage of class k trafﬁc accepted by an active queue
can be expressed as:
Pk = 1   P0
k (13)
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